How Much is Too Much?: Doctors’ Notes and Return-to-Work Policies under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act
Kaitlyn Stone1
An employer’s written policies are a prime example of how attention to even minute
linguistic choices is of the utmost importance. When properly drafted, these policies achieve,
among other significant purposes, a time-, money- and (let us be frank) face-saving goal:
insulation from liability. At worst, written policies have precisely the opposite effect – they
become detailed records of an employer’s violation and function as unintended printed proof of
liability.
For this reason, it is important to understand what employers may and may not include in
these written policies. The plethora of employer blogs exploring recent case law regarding the
safety of employer policies underscores this importance.2 Employer return-to-work policies are a
revealing subset of these written policies. An analysis of case law addressing return-to-work
policies affirms the effect that a single term can have on employer liability and the difficulty that
courts encounter when interpreting policies that straddle this line between compliance with and
violation of the law.3
The circuits are divided over the legality of popular return-to-work policies which require
employees to submit a doctors’ note detailing the nature of their illnesses to their immediate
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supervisors before they are permitted to return to work.4 The crux of this dispute focuses on
whether requiring doctors’ notes with specific details about an employee’s illness violates the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),5 which requires that all employers’ medical inquiries must
be driven by business necessity and be job-related.6 This issue is further complicated by the
relationship between the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.7
In Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio,8 the Sixth Circuit declared valid a policy which required
returning employees to give their immediate supervisor a physician’s note stating the “nature of the
illness” and the employee’s capacity to return to work under the Rehabilitation Act.9 Some
employer blogs call Lee an “employer-friend” decision.10 Nine years ago, however, the Second
Circuit decided in Conroy v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Services11 that a directive
requiring returning employees to supply a doctor’s note with a general diagnosis and a statement
about the employee’s capacity to return to work could tend to reveal a disability and violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act.12 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital,13 addressing the issue of cat’s paw liability for employers, further complicates
the question of whether employers may lawfully demand that a doctors’ note of this kind be
delivered to an employee’s immediate supervisor.14
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With an analytical framework perforated with such thinly drawn distinctions, should
employers really find comfort in the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Lee II?15 This Comment addresses
what employers are best advised to do regarding the requirement of doctors’ notes and return-towork policies.16
Mindful of how important it is for employers to understand what practices are and are not
legal, this Comment identifies a two-pronged strategy for how return-to-work policies may remain
safely within the requirements of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.17 Policies that look to an
employee’s capacity to return to work rather than inquiring into the nature or general diagnosis of
an employee’s illness avoid the confusion of the circuit split, while still achieving the main purpose
of these medical notes: to unveil whether or not an employee is medically ready to return to the
demands of his or her position. Furthermore, providing these notes to Human Resources instead of
the employee’s immediate supervisor bypasses any complications the Supreme Court’s holding in
Staub v. Proctor Hospital18 may present while still accomplishing the policy’s overall function.
Part II of this Comment presents an overview of the divided holdings of the Second and
Sixth Circuits, in addition to a discussion of the relationship between the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Part III analyzes the two-tiered failings of the Sixth
Circuit in Lee v. City of Columbus19: that the court assumes distinctions without ever establishing
their validity, and the fact that this distinction is likely non-existent in practice. Part III then
contrasts these failings with the Second Circuit’s findings in Conroy v. New York State Dep’t of
Correctional Services.20 Part III also reveals how Lee’s distinction between claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act weakens when one explores the
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definitions of variant terms of art necessary to its findings.21 Further, Part III notes how the Sixth
Circuit’s reliance on guidance and rulings from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) does not yield particularly persuasive results. Part III then contemplates how the Supreme
Court’s recent holding in Staub v. Proctor Hospital22 calls into question the permissibility of
submitting doctors’ notes to immediate supervisors.
Finally, Part IV presents a simple, workable solution for employers to adopt as a means of
avoiding disability discrimination liability. Included is an example of the proposed directive’s
follow-up option. Part IV of this Comment also addresses possible criticisms of the proposed
return-to-work policy and rebuts these concerns individually.
Part II: Applicable Statutory Law, Court Decisions and Scholarly Commentary
A. The Relationship between the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and
Return-to-Work Policies
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a civil rights law prohibiting discrimination
based on disability.23 It seeks to prevent Americans living with disabilities from being exposed to
stigma or unfair stereotyping.24 Specifically, the ADA prohibits employer discrimination against
“qualified individual[s] with a disability because of the disability of such individual[s] in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees.”25 With
regard to medical inquiries, the ADA allows employers to “make inquiries into the ability of an
employee to perform job-related functions.”26 Any information regarding an employee’s medical
condition must be “collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files” by
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the employer, and “treated as a confidential medical record, except that… supervisors and
managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee
and the necessary accommodations.”27 The ADA, however, defines acceptable medical inquiries
differently in the context of pre-employment.28 Employers may require medical exams and even
pose disability-related inquiries after providing a conditional job offer to an applicant.29 While
broader inquiries regarding health are permissible regarding job applicants under the ADA,30
employment decisions made in response to these inquiries must still reflect business judgment and
necessity and be directly related to an applicant’s ability to perform the specific position in
question.31
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),32 Congress’ response to the Supreme
Court’s restrictive interpretations of the term “disability,”33 amended the ADA. Most notably, the
ADAAA broadened the ADA’s disability coverage, stating that “the definition of disability . . .
shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this [Act], to the maximum
extent permitted by the terms of this [Act].”34 The ADAAA also specified that the determination
of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and thereby qualifies as a
disability, shall be made without consideration of such factors as “medication, medical supplies,
27
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equipment, or appliances, low-vision devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and cochlear implants or
other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or oxygen therapy equipment and
supplies.”35
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in programs
conducted by federal agencies, in federal employment generally, and in programs receiving federal
funding.36 It states that “n[o] otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . .
. shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, . . . be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”37 Note that the ADA prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability.38 The Rehabilitation Act "prohibits discrimination
solely on the basis of disability."39 Some interpret this dissimilarity to mean that "the
Rehabilitation Act permits an employer to make a decision because of the handicap if the
handicap is not the sole reason for the decision."40
B. The Second Circuit Disapproves of Policies Requiring a “General Diagnosis”
In Conroy v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Services,41 an employee of the New
York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) sued her employer alleging that DOCS’
medical return-to-work certification policy violated the ADA.42 The certification in question
“required employees to submit general diagnoses [ . . .] following certain absences.”43
Specifically, the diagnosis had to be “sufficiently informative as to allow [the employer] to make a
35
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determination concerning the employee's entitlement to leave or to evaluate the need to have an
employee examined by [the Employee Health Service] prior to returning to duty.”44 DOCS
claimed that, since the certification merely required a “general” diagnosis, its inquiries did not aim
to reveal whether an employee has a disability.45 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the
policy did trigger the protections of the ADA because DOCS’ inquiry tended to reveal her
disability.46
Finding for the plaintiff, the Second Circuit concluded that “since general diagnoses may
expose individuals with disabilities to employer stereotypes, the [p]olicy implicates the concerns
expressed in [the] provisions of the ADA.”47 The court clarified that while the ADA does not
prohibit all medical inquiries, it does prohibit those “as to whether such employee is an individual
with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability.”48
Furthermore, the Second Circuit stated that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) definition of “disability-related inquiry” also discredited DOCS’ argument.
The court cited Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Disability–Related Inquiries
and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)49
which states, “a ‘disability-related inquiry’ is a question that is likely to elicit information about a
disability, such as asking ‘employees about: whether they have or ever had a disability; the kinds
of prescription medications they are taking; and, the results of any genetic tests they have had.”50
Furthermore, the EEOC clarifies which inquiries are allowable, including “asking employees about
their general well-being; whether they can perform job functions; and about their current illegal use
44
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of drugs.”51 After determining that a general diagnosis may tend to reveal a disability, the court
held that requiring a general diagnosis is sufficient to trigger the protections of the ADA.52
D. The Sixth Circuit Approves of Directives Demanding a “Nature” Description under the
Rehabilitation Act
The district court of the Southern District of Ohio in Lee I53 agreed with the Second
Circuit’s ruling in Conroy.54 The City of Columbus’ policy in question, Directive 3.07 §
III(H)(1)(c), required “returning employees to submit a copy of their physician’s note, stating the
‘nature of the illness’ and whether the employee is capable of returning to regular duty” to the
employee’s immediate supervisor.55 The directive also required a doctor’s note stating the
“nature” of a family member’s illness if the employee was absent from work to care for a
relative.56 The district court held that the directive wrongfully provided supervisors with
confidential medical information.57 There was no need for direct supervisors to have such
information since the city’s human resources department could be used to “ensure confidentiality
and create a barrier between employees, supervisors, and sensitive medical information.”58
While concerned with the improper possession of medical information by direct
supervisors, the thrust of the district court’s decision was that directives of this kind are overintrusive under the ADA.59 The district court deemed the city’s “argument that it is not in control
of the extent or accuracy of the diagnoses the treating physician chooses to impart on the return to
51
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work document” irrelevant.60 Thus, Lee I61 followed the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Conroy,62
and held that the directive could tend to reveal a disability under the ADA and, by incorporation,
the Rehabilitation Act.63 Since the city failed to show a valid business necessity for the policy, the
district court granted the employee permanent injunctive relief.64
When the case went before the Sixth Circuit in Lee II, 65 the Sixth Circuit began its analysis
by noting that the Rehabilitation Act “addresses the confidentiality of medical records only in the
limited context of pre-employment examinations.”66 The Sixth Circuit did, however, mention that
the ADA’s limitations on medical inquiries67 are incorporated by reference into the Rehabilitation
Act.68 With this interpretation of the law, the court declared the plaintiff had to show that the city’s
policy constituted a prohibited inquiry into the plaintiff’s medical disability as defined by the ADA
in order to constitute a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.69
Next, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Conroy.70 Agreeing that a policy requiring the
doctor’s note to specify an employee’s general diagnosis would be in violation of the ADA “since
general diagnoses may expose individuals with disabilities to employer stereotypes,” the court
nevertheless found that theory inappropriate in the case at bar. 71 The Sixth Circuit emphasized a
distinction between a claim brought under the ADA and the present claim brought under the
Rehabilitation Act by way of the latter’s prohibition of discrimination based “solely” on disability.
The Sixth Circuit did not “find the requirement that an employee provide a general diagnosis – or
60
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in this case, an even less specific statement regarding the “nature” of an employee’s illness” – to be
tantamount to an inquiry “as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to
the nature or severity of the disability under § 12112(d)(4)(A).”72
The Sixth Circuit further clarified that, by merely requesting a general diagnosis that “may
tend to lead” the note’s reader to an awareness of an employee’s disability, an employer’s inquiry
falls short of proving discrimination “solely” on the basis of disability, as required under the
Rehabilitation Act.73 The Sixth Circuit then defined the appropriate inquiry for cases of this nature
as “whether a medical inquiry is intended to reveal, or necessitates revealing disability, rather than
whether the inquiry may merely tend to reveal a disability.”74 The Sixth Circuit found that a note
detailing the “nature” of illness neither “necessitated revealing” nor “intended to reveal” an
employee’s disability.75 Hence, it held the directive was not a prohibited inquiry about an
employee’s disability as defined by the Rehabilitation Act and, by incorporation, the ADA.76
The Sixth Circuit also criticized Conroy for painting with such “a broad brush, and finding
suspect any routine or general inquiry simply because it ‘may tend to reveal’ an employee’s
disability.”77 It held the Second Circuit’s interpretation “unnecessarily swept within the statute’s
prohibition numerous legitimate and innocuous inquiries that are not aimed at identifying a
disability.”78 While asking an employee for a list of prescriptions drugs he or she is taking, or
inquiring about an employee’s prior illnesses would trigger the protections of the ADA and
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Rehabilitation Act, the court reasoned that asking a returning employee simply “to describe the
“nature” of his illness […] is not necessarily a question about whether the employee is disabled.”79
Even if this was a disability inquiry, the Sixth Circuit held the directive was applied evenhandedly to all employees of the police division, and therefore, could not be in violation of the
ADA.80 According to the Sixth Circuit, the ADA does not prohibit workplace policies that equally
apply to all employees.81 The Sixth Circuit also looked to the EEOC: Enforcement Guidance in
support of its holding.82 Citing Questions and Answers,83 the court noted that “an employer is
entitled to know why an employee is requesting sick leave […and] may ask an employee to
provide a doctor’s note or other explanation as long as it has a policy or practice of requiring all
employees to do so.”84
The court also invoked EEOC administrative rulings in support of its holding.85
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit noted White v. Potter,86 where the EEOC determined that
“commission guidance makes clear that an employer may ask an employee to justify his/her use of
sick leave by providing a doctor’s note or other explanation, as long as it has a policy or practice
requiring all employees.”87 It also cited Donohugh v. Nicholson,88 where the EEOC determined
that even when an employee put her supervisor on notice that she required medical leave prior to
taking time off, a supervisor was still entitled to require reasonable medical documentation.89
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Finally, the court found McGill v. Munoz90 supportive because it held that, so long as a policy is
equally applied to all employees, the policy is appropriate.91 Since the City of Columbus’ directive
was universal, the court found it consistent with the above authorities and deemed it an acceptable
inquiry under § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the Rehabilitation Act.92
Finally, the court briefly addressed whether it was appropriate for an employer to ask
employees to submit the doctors’ note to a direct supervisor.93 The Sixth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs could not challenge the directive on the mere speculation that immediate supervisors
might violate the statute’s confidentiality provisions.94 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit criticized the
lower court for attempting to draw a distinction between the impermissibility of providing doctors’
notes to immediate supervisors and the permissibility of providing them to Human Resources
departments.95 Thus, Lee II held: “there is no language in either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA
that, with regard to the processing of medical inquiries, differentiates between employers based on
the size or organizational structure of the work force or the existence of a separate human resources
department.”96
The Sixth Circuit once again turned for support to EEOC Guidance, which states: “The
approval of sick leave is a responsibility of the supervisor,” who “shall determine that… medical
documentation submitted by the employee […] supports charging the absence to sick leave” and
that it is appropriate for first-line supervisors to review and approve ADA accommodation requests
in the first instance.97 The Sixth Circuit declared that in order “to eliminate unnecessary levels of

90

203 F.3d 843 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 847-48.
92
Lee II, 636 F.3d 245, 257 (6th Cir. 2011).
93
Id. at 257.
94
Id. at 258.
95
Id. at 257,
96
Id. at 258.
97
Id. at 258.
91

review, agencies should authorize first-line supervisors to approve requests for reasonable
accommodation whenever possible.”98
E. Commentators Split Over Permissive Content of Doctors’ Notes
While scholarship addressing return-to-work policies and doctors’ notes is exceptionally
sparse,99 law blogs advising employers are abuzz with the issue, in light of the Sixth Circuit’s splitcreating decision.100 Many blogs see Lee II101 as employer-friendly, claiming the court provided a
favorable decision for employers with operations in states within the Sixth Circuit.102 These
reports warn readers, however, that “the permissible limits of an employer’s right to require
employees to disclose medical information upon returning from sick leave still are uncertain” in
light of the split between the circuits.103
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Some blogs commend the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lee II,104 while others remain skeptical
despite advising employers of what they may and may not include in a return-to-work policies in
light of Lee II.105 Dan Kohrman, Senior Attorney of the AARP Foundation, expressed concerned
that the Sixth Circuit’s take on doctors’ notes will open the elderly to a higher possibility of
disability discrimination.106 Others question whether it is “good practice to permit the immediate
supervisor to have access to such information is a practical issue based on the organizational
structure and the location of the business.”107
Other blogs have attempted to advise employers as to what they may and may not include
in a return-to-work policy in light of Lee II.108 One blog proposes a two-step analysis that
employers should use to review their policies in the wake of Lee II,109 encouraging in-house
counsel to “ask two key questions in examining their policies: Why does the organization require a
doctor's note from a returning employee, and is it a job-related or business necessity to know why
an employee needed to use sick leave?”110
Whether in favor or in distrust of the Sixth Circuit’s holding, the majority of employer
blogs understand the decision as confirming “an employer’s ability to make inquiries about the
104

Colter Paulson, Creating a Split with the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit Approves Sick Leave Policies That
May Reveal a Disability to a Supervisor, SQUIRE SANDERS (Sept. 18, 2011, 3:56 PM),
http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/creating-a-split-with-the-second-circuit-the-sixth-circuitapproves-sick-leave-policies-that-may-rev/.
105
See generally Colter Paulson, Creating a Split with the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit Approves Sick Leave
Policies That May Reveal a Disability to a Supervisor, SQUIRE SANDERS (Sept. 18, 2011, 3:56 PM),
http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/creating-a-split-with-the-second-circuit-the-sixth-circuitapproves-sick-leave-policies-that-may-rev/; Dan Kohrman, Appeals Court Fails to Extend Protection Against
Intrusive Disability-Related Inquiries, AARP FOUNDATION (Sept. 18, 3:13 PM),
http://www.aarp.org/work/employee-rights/info-03-2011/lee_v_city_of_columbus.html.
106
Dan Kohrman, Appeals Court Fails to Extend Protection Against Intrusive Disability-Related Inquiries, AARP
FOUNDATION (Sept. 18, 3:13 PM), http://www.aarp.org/work/employee-rights/info-032011/lee_v_city_of_columbus.html.
107
Claudia D. Orr, Court Rules Employer’s Request for General Diagnosis Does Not Violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act, PLUNKETT COONEY (Sept. 18, 3:26 PM), http://www.plunkettcooney.com/publications-287.html.
108
See supra note 97.
109
Lee II, 636 F.3d 245 (6th Cir. 2011).
110
Joanne Sammer, Court Says Doctor’s Note Requirement Doesn’t Violate Disability Law, INSIDE COUNSEL, (Oct.
29, 4:55 PM), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/05/01/court-says-doctors-note-requirement-?page=2.

reason for an employee’s sick leave” so long as employers ensure “that any such policies are
applied consistently and uniformly,”111 and advise employers to create return-to-work policies
accordingly.
III. Discussion
A. Problematic and Less-than-Pragmatic Duality
Both the Second112 and Sixth113 Circuits’ holdings, and the employer blogs’ discussions of
their possible meanings, agree that an employer who requires a returning employee to submit a
doctor’s note merely specifying that the employee is indeed capable of resuming the duties of his
or her post generally does not present an issue within the context of the ADA or the Rehabilitation
Act. Instead, it was the duality of the notes at bar that acted as the catalyst for litigation.114
Requiring a doctors’ note to also clarify the employee’s general diagnosis (if in the Second Circuit)
or “nature of the illness” (if in the Sixth Circuit) is the point of contention between the circuits.115
A deeper analysis of these kinds of directives, particularly in the context of real-world application,
suggests such requests are excessive.116 If employers eliminate the secondary inquiry, they will
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avoid trouble with the ADA or Rehabilitation Act while receiving all the information necessary for
these directives to be effective.117
I. The Federal Circuit’s Superficial Distinctions between Directives’ “Variant” Requests
The circuits’ use of variant terminology for this second requirement of the mandatory
doctors’ notes – “general diagnosis”118 versus “nature of the illness”119 – is likely more significant
in theory than in practice.120 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit’s treatment of Conroy121 does not entirely
defy this assertion, for the court made little fuss over the distinction in word choice.122 While
agreeing that a “general diagnosis” would violate the ADA, the Sixth Circuit ultimately exerted
most of its energy in drawing a distinction between claims brought under the ADA and claims
brought under the Rehabilitation Act.123 Importantly, it emphasized the Rehabilitation Act’s use of
the term “solely” instead of focusing on the linguistic details of the required return-to-work
policies.124 The Sixth Circuit’s opinion does little to establish a notable gap between a “general
diagnosis,” which it regards as permissible under both laws, and the “nature of the illness,” which
it regards as impermissible under the ADA and consequently under the Rehabilitation Act.

of employee-1 and other similarly situated employees. Id. Noting the existing split between the second and sixth
circuits, the Dillard's court held that the El Centro store's policy was improper because it required the nature of the
absence and the condition being treated, which "permitted supervisors to conduct impermissible disability-related
inquiries" under 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Id. Finding no distinction between requesting the "nature of one's
illness" and a "general diagnosis, the court held Dillard's policy of requesting "the nature of the
absence" "substantially similar to the 'brief general diagnosis'" held improper in Conroy because both types of
inquiries may tend to reveal disability.
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Instead, the Sixth Circuit assumes a difference between requiring a note with a “general
diagnosis” as opposed to one with a description of “the nature of the illness” without ever
analytically establishing or defining the distinction.125 The court does “not find the requirement
that an employee provide a general diagnosis—or in this case, an even less specific statement
regarding the “nature” of an employee's illness—” as equivalent to inquiring whether an employee
has a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.126 While claiming to “distinguish” Conroy, Lee II
truly splits from it.127 Perhaps this weak classification as “distinguished” is further evidence that
the Lee II holding is not the fortress of employer-protection some employer blogs suggest it is.128
The Sixth Circuit attempts to clarify this point when it states: “Obviously, asking an
employee whether he is taking prescription drugs or medication” would cross the threshold into
inexcusable inquiry.129 But, is the difference between asking about the “nature of an illness” and
inquiring into an employee’s medications really as “obvious” as the Sixth Circuit says it is?130 The
court’s failure to elaborate on the difference may suggest it is not.131 This shortcoming, rather, is
more likely evidence of a near-impossible distinction to draw. The fact that the Sixth Circuit
immediately changes gears and focuses on the significance of bringing suits under the ADA as
opposed to the Rehabilitation Act also supports this theory. The court’s refusal to explain the
125
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distinction at any length suggests a forced concession to the fact that the difference is subtle, if not
nominal, and further clarifies that Lee II may not be the employer safe-haven some blogs say it
is.132
Admittedly, there is an inferential step between knowing the “nature” of an employee’s
illness and having knowledge of his or her disability.133 The Sixth Circuit’s denial of any
possibility that such an inference exists, however, is a substantial hole its holding.134 While
information about the “nature” of an employee’s illness does not guarantee an immediate
supervisor will make that cognitive leap toward knowing the employee’s disability, it is by no
means impossible, either.135 The ability to infer an employee’s disability from a list of medications
he or she is taking seems equivalent, if not identical, to the ability to infer one’s disability from an
explanation of the “nature” of his or her illness.136 The ADAAA also supports this notion because
it prohibits the determination of disability through reliance on such facts as the employee’s
“medication, medical supplies,[. . .] hearing aids and cochlear implants or other implantable
hearing devices, mobility devices[. . . .]”137
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Since the Lee II court conceded that inquiry into the general diagnosis is improper under
the ADA, the possibility that “the nature of an illness” will provide an awareness of a disability
also treads dangerously close to violation of the law.138 Furthermore, the inferential leaps
necessary to jump from knowledge of an employee’s general diagnosis to an awareness of his or
her disability (deemed inappropriate by both Circuits) are the same inferential leaps necessary to
the jump from knowledge of an employee’s illness’ “nature” to his or her disability. If a difference
exists at all, it is so thin a veil between the two circumstances that employers should find no solace
in it.
A closure of the cognitive gap between knowledge of the “nature of the illness” and an
awareness of an employee’s disability is not a certain one when a supervisor has knowledge of the
“nature” of an employee’s illness.139 The Sixth Circuit’s refusal to consider the possibility of such
an occurrence, however, suggests that the Sixth Circuit does not believe the ADA or, by
incorporation, the Rehabilitation Act, are concerned with such a situation.140 Yet, the ADA and
Rehabilitation Acts are not concerned with only guaranteed instances of discrimination.141 These
laws aim to prevent all discrimination based on disability in the employment context.142
II. A False Distinction Revealed Through Application
Perhaps the Lee II court refused to analyze the difference between a “general diagnosis”
and a description of the “nature of an illness” because the distinction is particularly insignificant, if
not nonexistent, in practice.143 The City of Columbus acknowledged this very real possibility at
the district court level, in response to which the district court clarified that the “argument that it is
138
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not in control of the extent or accuracy of the diagnoses the treating physician chooses to impart on
the return to work document” was irrelevant to its decision. 144 While an employer’s control, or
lack thereof, over the responses of medical professionals may have been irrelevant, the fact that
these notes may reveal more than is asked for because of some miscommunication goes to the very
heart of the ADA and, by incorporation, the Rehabilitation Act, because over-revelation increases
the chance that a supervisor will discover an employee’s disability and discriminate against the
employee on the basis of that disability.145 The City itself admitted that these doctors’ notes may
not provide precisely the information requested; if they were to reveal more, the argument that
these notes tend to reveal a disability becomes all the stronger, and the potential for incurring
liability becomes that much a higher for the employer.
Also, mindful of the fast-paced, hectic work environment of most medical professionals, it
seems unlikely doctors will always heed the nuanced expectations established by variant legal
terms of art like the “nature of the illness.” Given the Sixth Circuit’s own failure to distinguish
between the permissible “nature of an illness” and the impermissible “general diagnosis,” a
medical professional could easily, even would easily, misconstrue the terms.146 It is not reasonable
to expect a professional of another field to successfully do so. Detailing the “nature of an illness”
may seem to medical professionals as though it requires more words than simply stating a general
diagnosis. This suggests that the two types of directives may, in practice, actually yield notes from
doctors with identical content – an impermissibly general diagnosis.
When asked what responses she would provide to either directive, Nursing Professor and
Nurse Practitioner Denise Coppa reported that both directives made her uncomfortable because
145
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they inquire into privileged information under HIPAA.147 For this reason, Coppa claimed she
would err on the side of caution and discuss only whether her patient was able to return to work
and would not mention a “general diagnosis” or any similar information in her response to either
directive.148 She stressed that while this would be her response, the directives did seem to seek an
improper level of detail regarding the employee’s health, and she disagreed that some practitioners
may provide the requested information, with patient permission.149 When prompted to divulge
what differences she observed between the two directives, Coppa said that she believed “nature of
the illness” could be construed as seeking such qualifiers as “good,” “serious,” “critical,” and
[while that] may be enough for the employer,” it would still be improper, in her opinion, to divulge
any such information, even those one-word descriptions, without the written consent of the
patient.150
In contrast, Optometrist Dr. Laura Perrin151 would “state a general diagnosis only” in
response to either directive, and would not make “an assessment about the patient's ability to
resume his or her work duties.”152 Perrin clarified that her general responses to directives of this
kind contain a “brief note with the patient's name, [date of birth], and date of eye service” in
which she state that “the patient was treated in [her] office for an 'eye condition' that impeded
vision and required medical treatment.”153 She also noted that she is comfortable writing these
types of notes only after treatment is complete, because she would never provide an employer
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with an estimation.154 When prompted to discuss any differences she identified between the two
types of directives, Perrin noted that the difference was “a fine one.”155 According to Perrin, the
directive requesting a “general diagnosis” is self-evident in what it seeks, and “is appropriate
because an employer should know what general effect the medical problem may have on his or
her employee's ability to function in the workplace. If a patient [cannot] see properly, then this
would clearly impede his or her ability to perform his or her tasks, whereas a mobility problem
may well be accommodated in the workplace.”156
On the other hand, Perrin noted that a directive requesting a description of the “nature of
the illness” “requests a more specific description of the medical problem.”157 She percieved that
this “more specific description of a patient's eye condition exceeds the bounds of doctor/patient
confidentiality…. and [it is] unnecessary, as the decision as to whether the patient is capable of
performing his work is best determined directly by the patient and employer.”158 Finally, Perrin
stressed that estimating a patient’s ability to perform his or her duties at work is beyond the
scope of her rights and obligations.159 She clarified that she is “not qualified to make such an
assessment, as work settings and work tasks vary tremendously and differ with each specific
case.”160
Of course, some physicians will interpret these directives consistently with the obscure
distinction implicated by the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Lee II;161 however it is unlikely all doctors
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will, as highlighted by the variant interpretations mentioned above.162 The reality is that even if a
small percentage of doctors respond to these kinds of directives with too much information
regarding an employee’s ailment, those employees will be more likely to suffer disability-based
discrimination. Just as the district court in Lee II was not persuaded by the city’s argument that it
could not control physicians’ answers to its note requests, courts are equally unlikely to be
persuaded by an employer claiming that some, or even most, doctors do interpret these directives
in accordance with how the courts interpret them. Even one medical professional misconstruing
the directive and providing an employee’s supervisor with too-detailed a description of the illness
could open an employer to liability. This reality suggests that elimination of the second inquiry of
these directives is the safest choice for employers seeking to avoid these kinds of suits.
Furthermore, since the notes will still address whether the employee is healthy enough to
return to work, their content seems to remain sufficient to meet the employers’ purposes for
utilizing the directives, even with removal of the secondary inquiry. The ADA makes clear that
only baseline questions regarding an employee’s health, stemming from a legitimate business
purpose, are appropriate inquires.163 Hence, the duality of a doctor’s note like that considered by
the Sixth Circuit in Lee II seems excessive.164 Unless there is some business reason that requires
inquiry into the employee’s illness, a note with this excessive duality seems to dance dangerously
close to the line between compliance and violation of the ADA. Thus, elimination of this dualnature is the soundest recommendation to employers seeking to insulate themselves from the
possibility of liability within the context of return-to-work policies.
III. The Employers’ Purposes: Does Duality Stem from a Legitimate Business Purpose?
162
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This framework then invites, or even more accurately, demands answer to the question: Do
basic business reasons justify this secondary inquiry? While one can, with effort, imagine a unique
profession in which the demands of a given employee’s position are so detailed, specific, and
connected to certain aspects to the employee’s good health, that an employer’s inquiry into the
“nature” of an illness could perhaps be justified by a legitimate business reason. These
circumstances, however, likely arise in few cases, and certainly do not constitute the norm. Thus,
whether basic business reasons, universal to many types of employers, make this duality of
doctors’ notes necessary for the note’s efficiency is the proper inquiry.
John Harper, Senior Compliance and Employment Counsel to BASF, the largest chemical
company in the world that currently employs more than 100,000 employees in 80 countries,
provided insight into the possible reasons why an employer may inquire about the “nature” of an
employee’s illness.165 When asked generally if an employer could have a legitimate business
reason for proposing this kind of directive, Harper answered in the affirmative.166 Further
expansion on his response, however, revealed that this legitimate business reason is usually only
present – and present with good reason – when the employee works in a “safety-sensitive
position,” or in a job in which the employee’s good bill of health is essential to successful
completion of the position’s demands.167 Jobs of this sort typically include those within the roles
of “production, maintenance and utilities.”168 For example, Harper noted that a chemist suffering
from an ailment that could cause him to unexpectedly faint is particularly detrimental in his job’s
physical environment, to his safety, and to the safety of others in his work environment.169 A
fainting chemist in a laboratory is significantly more dangerous than a fainting accountant in an
165
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office. Thus, in the cases of employees in safety-sensitive positions, these secondary inquiries are
aimed at not only employee-safety but also liability avoidance.
Yet, why does the employer concern itself with an employee’s illness when that employee
is now returning to work, presumably after the ailment has receded? Sometimes, doctor’s notes
approve an employee to return to work “with restrictions,” according to Harper.170 If a note merely
clears an employee to return to work without restrictions, such is generally sufficient for the
employer in Harper’s experience.171 Harper noted that if a note does contain restrictions, however,
a secondary set of inquiries is then set into motion.172 At BASF, in these cases, the employee’s
doctor may be asked for further clarification on these restrictions, the employee may be asked to
undergo a “return to work exam” from the company’s own Corporate Medical Department’s
doctors, or the employee may be asked to obtain an independent “fitness for duty” exam from an
outside physician .173 Note that the company’s own doctors directly receive employee’s medical
notes; immediate supervisors and Human Resources do not receive letters of this nature.174 Thus,
in Harper’s experience, inquiring further into the “nature” of an employee’s illness is triggered
only by an initial doctor’s note listing restrictions on the employee’s performance.175 In less
complicated circumstances, a note clearing the employee to fully return to his or her duties at the
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company is “generally okay.”176 Whether the company takes its inquiries a step further is a factspecific determination.177
When asked whether there are any universal business reasons, applicable to most
employers, that may justify inquiry into the “nature” of an employee’s illness, Harper said,
“cynicism on part of employers.”178 Harper noted instances when employers receive similar notes
from the same doctor regarding different employees over time, suggesting that perhaps the doctor
is simply providing the employee with a reason to be excused from work without truly making a
diagnosis at all.179 Harper clarified that such instances are by no means the norm, but they “do
happen.”180 In these circumstances, the employer’s secondary-tier of inquiry regarding the illness’
“nature” functions as a safeguard against fraud on part of the employee.181
Finally, Harper expressed that, in application, the difference between a directive requesting
a general diagnosis and one requesting the “nature” of an illness will lie “in the eye of the
beholder.”182 His inclination is that “if [the employer] goes for more than a “with/without
restrictions” [distinction in their directive], it will get a diagnosis” in response.183 In closing, he
stressed that these policies are all about employers balancing variant concerns that are in tension
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with one another: Balancing concerns regarding safety, liability, cynicism and fraud against a
desire to comply with the provisions of the ADA.184
When addressing an employee who does not hold a safety-sensitive position and is capable
to return to work without restrictions, employers inquiring into the general diagnosis or “nature” of
an employee’s illness are merely doubling-up on the directive’s first inquiry, and asking an
inexcusably probing question that adds nothing of value to the answer already ascertained. Since
erring on the side of excess is more likely to incur ADA liability, employers are best advised to
avoid dual return-to-work directives in these circumstances. The City of Columbus’ directive itself
also supports the assertion that dual-natured notes are excessive. It demanded a statement of the
“nature” of a family member’s illness, if the employee took time to care for a family member.185
One struggles to imagine a situation where the knowledge of a family member’s illness is
necessary to the determination of whether the employee is ready to return to work.
While equal application of the directive is one of the details the Sixth Circuit hung its
proverbial hat on in Lee II, it is difficult to conceive of why an employer would cast the net of
equal application so wide and would ask the “nature” of a loved one’s illness.186 One struggles
even harder to think of how that “nature” could impact the employee’s performance once he or she
returned to his or her post at work. In these cases, the directives are not excessive for doubling-up
on the same inquiry in an inexcusably probing manner. Instead, they are excessive because the
second inquiry can serve no business purpose, and thus open the employer to liability under the
ADA.
Yet, as Harper’s insight revealed, further inquiries into an employee’s health may be
justified when dealing with a safety-sensitive position or an employee cleared to return to work
184
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“with restrictions.”187 Even in these circumstances, however, asking about the “nature” of the
illness is not advisable. Harper suggested seeking mere clarification instead. Thus, even in such
cases, requesting a description of the “nature” of the illness will still be excessive and unnecessary
for the employer’s purposes. Furthermore, as clarified by Harper above, asking for such will likely
yield a general diagnosis and will ultimately open the company up to liability under the ADA.188
The ADA allows an employer to “make inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform jobrelated functions.”189 Since a follow-up policy could be limited to clarifying questions about an
employee’s ability to perform, and because ability to perform job-related functions is not
necessarily defined by the illness itself, inquiry into the “nature” crosses the line.
B. The Sixth Circuit Haphazardly Hangs Hats on Claims under Variant Statutes
The Sixth Circuit190 drew a distinction between claims under the ADA, as seen in
Conroy,191 and claims under the Rehabilitation Act, as was the case in Lee II.192 The Sixth Circuit
suggested that the Rehabilitation Act establishes a higher standard for plaintiffs to meet, requiring
“that plaintiffs demonstrate that they have been discriminated against solely by reason of a
disability.”193 Thus, it found that “the mere fact that an employer, pursuant to a sick leave policy,
requests a general diagnosis that may tend to lead to information about disabilities falls short of
the requisite proof that the employer is discriminating solely on the basis of disability.”194
Therefore, it suggests that a proper analysis focuses on “whether a medical inquiry is
intended to reveal, or necessitates revealing disability, rather than whether the inquiry may
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merely tend to reveal a disability.”195 Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff must show
that a directive “intends to” reveal or “necessitates revealing” a disability.196 “Tending to” reveal
a disability is insufficient under the Rehabilitation Act, according to the Sixth Circuit.197 The
Sixth Circuit’s attempt to draw a dividing line between directives that “necessitate,” “intend,”
and “tend to” reveal a disability invites the question: Are there actual differences between
directives that achieve one of these three aims in practice, and if so, are these distinctions so
significant that employers may confidently distinguish them?
1. Definition: “Intends”/“Necessitates”
A directive which “intends to” or “necessitates” revelation of a disability would pass the
Sixth Circuit’s standard.198 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “intend” as “1. To have in mind a
fixed purpose to reach a desired object; to have as one’s purpose […] 2. To contemplate that the
usual consequences of one’s act will probably or necessarily follow from the act, whether or not
those consequences are desired for their own sake […] 3. To signify or mean.”199 The Oxford
English Dictionary defines “intend” as “to stretch out, extend, expand, increase, intensify, […] to
start on a journey; to set out, [. . .] to give auditory attention [. . .], [. . .] to give ear to […] to
have in the mind as a fixed purpose; to purpose, design.”200
The definitions suggest that “intention” may depend on inference. “Signification” and
“meaning” are worthless without inference and interpretation. The acts of “stretching out,
extending” and “expanding” are inherent to the process of drawing an inference. These realities
suggest that a directive which “intends” to reveal disability (deemed inappropriate by the Lee
195
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court) and one which merely “tends” to reveal disability through the assistance of an inferential
step (approved of by the Lee II court) are not so different in practice. Both processes utilize the
same procedures.
Black’s Law Dictionary does not define “necessitates.” Instead, it defines the Latin
“Necessarius” as “1. Necessary; essential. 2. Unavoidable, obligatory, compelling.”201 The
Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb form “necessitate” as “to make necessary, to
demand, require, or involve a necessary condition, accompaniment or result, [ . . .] to reduce a
person to want or need.”202 These definitions suggest that drawing a line between
“necessitating” and “intending” or “tending to” is the closest the Sixth Circuit comes to a sound
distinction.203 However, this is not the difference the Lee II court attempted to define, for they
declared “necessitates” and “intends” equal in its standard under the Rehabilitation Act.204
While a supervisor who knows the “nature” of an employee’s illness will not necessarily
discriminate against the employee on the basis of disability, in the case where such
discrimination does occur, the note will be the necessary condition of the events. If not for the
note, there would be no way to discover the disability and thus no discrimination. The question
then becomes: What does the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act seek to protect, the possible or
only the probable? As noted in Part II above, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not seek to
protect employees from the guaranteed, the necessarily-going-to-occur discrimination in the
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workplace.205 These provisions seek to protect employees from all disability-based
discrimination.
Even if the Lee standard was that directives which “necessitate” revelation of a disability
are the only type that violate the Rehabilitation Act, such a holding would be so fuzzy and rest
upon such a weak analytical foundation that employers should not find solace in it. This,
however, was not the standard spelled out by the Sixth Circuit. Lee II held that a directive which
“intends” to reveal a disability is also over the line, and the distinction between “intends” and
“tends to” is flimsy at best.206
2. Definition: “Tend”
According to the Sixth Circuit, a directive that merely “tends to” reveal a disability does
not pass the standard spelled out in Lee II.207 Black’s Law Dictionary defines the verb form of
“tend” as “1. To be disposed toward (something); 2. To serve, contribute, or conduct in some
degree or way; to have a more or less direct bearing or effect; 3. To be directed or have a
tendency to (an end, object, or purpose.)”208 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “tend” as
“to have it in the mind as a purpose to do something,[. . . ] to understand or apprehend, […] to
wait for, await; to look out for expectantly, […] to have the care and oversight of; to take charge
of, to look after, [or] to turn one’s ear, give auditory attention, listen, hearken.”209
Note that both “tend” and “intend” include in their definitions the concept of turning
one’s ear to information. Being “directed or hav[ing] a tendency” (the essence of tend) truly
differs in practice from “having it in mind” (the essence of intend). These similarities suggest
205

See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (describing the central purpose of the ADA as aiming to enable disabled
individuals to enjoy “the economic and social mainstream of American life.”)
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (9th ed. 2009).
209
Tend Definition, OED.COM,
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.shu.edu/view/Entry/199029?rskey=WcxfjW&result=3&isAdvanced=false#eid (last
visited September 28, 2011).

that which “tends” and that which “intends” are not very dissimilar in practice. The definitions
of “tend” also align themselves with the notion that a directive inquiring into the “nature” of an
illness is possibly just one inferential step away from revelation of disability, just as knowledge
of a general diagnosis is merely one step away from the same conclusion.210
Even if a directive merely “tends” to reveal a disability, the directive still “serves,
contributes or conducts in some degree or way” the inference necessary to reveal an employee’s
disability.211 Such a directive enables one, even perhaps subconsciously to “look out for
expectantly” the inference necessary to make this discovery. Directives inquiring into the
“nature of an illness” “dispose” the receiver of that information (in the Lee II case the immediate
supervisor) “toward” the inference necessary to reveal an employee’s disability, and possibly
open the employee to discrimination on the basis of that disability.
The above definitions support the Sixth Circuit in that “tend” does not mean the directive
will certainly reveal the disability.212 The definitions, however, also reveal that a directive which
“tends” to reveal disability increases the possibility of discrimination based on that disability.
The information submitted to supervisors in dual-natured doctor’s notes increases the likelihood
that supervisors will take the short inferential step from merely reading the note to suspecting, or
discovering, the employee’s disability. It logically follows that with knowledge of these notes,
supervisors are then situated in a position to better ascertain an employee’s disability. When
awareness of the disability abounds, the likelihood for discrimination on the basis of that
disability increases. This increased likelihood, of course, increases the employer’s likelihood of
becoming liable under the ADA or, through incorporation and this analytical framework, the
210
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Rehabilitation Act. For this reason, employers should be skeptical of the presumed protection
the Lee II holding provides them.
C. Equal Application Provides Little Shelter
Instead of concerning itself with the very real possibility that this inferential step can take
place from a doctor’s note containing the “nature” of an employee’s illness, the Sixth Circuit
attempted to further support its approval of the City of Columbus’ directive by pointing out that
the return-to-work policy applied equally to all employees.213 The directive was therefore “not
prohibited by the ADA because it is a workplace policy applicable to all employees, disabled or
not.”214 Even so, it is the actions that occur after a doctor has provided a note to an immediate
supervisor which implicate the ADA and Rehabilitation Act: specifically, the increased
likelihood that an immediate supervisor may, by knowing of an employee’s “general diagnosis”
or the “nature” of his or her illness, infer the employee’s disability, 215 thereby exposing the
employee to a higher possibility of disability-based discrimination.216 For those who do not have
a disability to be revealed, no possibility of discrimination follows. However, for those who do
have a disability that may be revealed by this information, discrimination becomes more likely.
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on equal application of the city’s directive provides little
safe haven to employers with similar policies in practice.217
D. The Sixth Circuit’s Reliance on the EEOC
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The Lee II court also found unsound support for its “equal means appropriate” finding in
Questions and Answers.218 Citing Question 15, the Sixth Circuit noted the EEOC states that “an
employer is entitled to know why an employee is requesting sick leave.”219 An employer,
therefore, may ask an employee to provide a doctor’s note or other explanation as long as it has a
policy or practice of requiring all employees to do so.”220 This guidance does not mention
doctors’ notes that inquire into the “nature” of one’s illness.221 The phrase “or other
explanation” may indicate favorable treatment of the “nature” requirement.222 More likely, it
suggests that another method of communication is allowable, but not another form of inquiry.
This latter interpretation of the phrase is supported by the structure of the entire sentence:
“provide a doctor’s note or other explanation.”223 This syntactical structure suggests that the
“other” is an alternative to the note – the means of communicating information – not the
information contained therein.224 Thus, the EEOC clarifies that perhaps a telephone call or email
would suffice instead of a note.225 It does not state that inquiring into the “nature” of an
employee’s illness is acceptable.226
Concededly, the EEOC does assert that an employer is “entitled to know why an
employee is requesting sick leave.”227 This is the strongest evidence is in favor of the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation of the law and circumstances. However, the EEOC does not explicitly
define this “why.” This “why” could be satisfied by a note merely stating that the employee is
218
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ill. This “why” could be in reference to those special circumstances in which further inquiry is
appropriate, such as those noted by Harper.228 This “why” could be evidence of the cynicism
surrounding doctors’ notes in response to return-to-work directives.229 By failing to further
expand on what precisely the employer is entitled to know, the EEOC’s guidance provides some,
but little, strength to the Sixth Circuit’s holding and little confidence for employers.230
Furthermore, the protection provided by Question 15, if any, is diminished by the fact
that the EEOC’s guidance does not have the force of law.231 The court itself conceded that the
guidance was “non-binding.”232 Thus, Question 15 is merely persuasive authority, and supports
only the general proposition that policies applying to all employees are usually acceptable under
the ADA.233 Since the strength of that evidence was debunked above, Question 15 does little to
support the holding in Lee II.
The Lee II court also cited two EEOC rulings and one District of Columbia Circuit case
to little avail.234 White v. Potter235 also put stock in the notion that “an employer may ask an
employee to justify his/her use of sick leave by providing a doctor’s note or other explanation as
long as it has a policy or practice requiring all employees” to follow it, it was an acceptable
practice.236 At best, this holding bolsters the already-debunked notion that if a policy applies
equally to all, it is appropriate. As noted above, the inquiries are what are at issue in these cases,
not the application of the policies.
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Donoghue v. Nicholson,237 another EEOC ruling, does even less in the way of support for
the Lee II holding. Donoghue was chiefly concerned with the appropriate means of
communication through which an employer may receive notification of an employee’s request of
sick leave.238 This case seems to align itself with the EEOC’s interpretation which suggests that
the phrase “or other explanation” refers to the appropriate means through which directive
requests may be communicated, not proper types of inquiries.
Finally, the Lee II court cited McGill v. Munoz.239 Like White,240 this case addressed
equal application of a policy, and how a policy which is applied equally is legitimate.241 Any
discussion of the “nature” of an illness, or the content of a note, is wholly absent. Thus,
McGill242 does equally as little as White243 and Donoghue244 to bolster the Lee II holding, for the
above authorities do not directly address what is an “acceptable inquiry” is under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act. Instead, they are concerned with the fact that requiring doctor’s notes, as a
form of documentation, is permissible and with the equal application of sick leave policies.
Neither of these findings provides the Lee II holding with enough breadth to shield employers
with dual-natured directives from liability.
F. Staub’s Complicating Contribution to Placing Doctors’ Notes in Immediate Supervisors’
Hands
The City of Columbus’ directive required employees to deliver physician’s notes to an
immediate manager.245 While the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs could not challenge the
directive on the mere speculation that immediate supervisors might violate the statute’s
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confidentiality provisions,246 courts may disagree with this holding in light of the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.247 In that case, an employee’s supervisor fabricated a
disciplinary incident because of the supervisor’s personal animosity towards the employee’s
military obligations.248 These events subsequently led the company’s Human Resources
department to terminate the military.249 The Supreme Court held the employer liable under the
cat’s paw liability theory250 because the supervisor discriminated against the employee with intent
to see the employee ultimately fired, and the employee was, in fact, fired.251 The fact that the
“innocent” Human Resources department was the ultimate decision maker regarding the choice to
terminate did not shield the company from liability.252
In light of the Supreme Court’s adoption of the theory of cat’s paw liability for employers,
some suggest that the Staub holding253 may prompt employers to remove tangible employment
action254 choices from the hands of lower-level supervisors and instead leave such choices solely in
the hands of Human Resources departments, and those departments should exercise caution in
relying on information from the supervisors.255 The degree of separation between the doctors’ note
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and one in a position to discriminate against the employee is key to success; keeping such
information out of the hands of immediate supervisors is a significantly safer route. Although this
choice will not completely protect employers from liability, it will decrease the chances of a
successful cat’s paw liability claim against the company.
Indeed, a plethora of employer blogs are encouraging employers to provide supervisors
with special training as a means of avoiding cat’s paw liability, or removing powers relating to
hiring and firing from supervisors altogether.256 If advising employers to move hiring and firing
powers out of the hands of supervisors is advisable, it is equally wise for employers to keep
medical information that may tend to, intend to or necessitate revelation of an employee’s
disability out of the hands of direct supervisors too. If a manager’s discrimination based on bias
against military involvement could be imputed onto the employer, discrimination based on
disability could just as easily fit that mold.
While some employer blogs deem Lee II an employer-friendly decision, Staub is
undisputedly far from it. Since suing one’s employer just became that much easier under cat’s
paw liability theory, it makes the most sense for employers to, now more than ever before, avoid
liability for disability discrimination. Removing information that, with the assistance of a mere
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inferential step could reveal an employee’s disability, from the hands of immediate supervisors is
the best advice for employers.
IV. Trim Down to Avoid Liability: Single-Inquiry Return-to-Work Policies
Instead of navigating the unequal waters between the Second and Sixth Circuits, and
contemplating how to strategically remain within the boundaries of the more favorable
jurisdiction, employers have an easily-implemented, effective solution at their disposal which
will enable them to obtain all information necessary to the effective execution of work while still
avoiding liability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The solution is divided: into types
of employees returning to work (those in safety-sensitive position and those not), and into those
cleared to return to work with restrictions, and those without.
1. Single-Inquiry Protection from Liability: A Proposed Return-to-Work Policy
For all employees returning to work, the initial step in the proposed, safest return-to-work
policy is to merely inquire, in the first phase of your directive, whether the employee is healthy
and ready to return to work. In response to this single inquiry, a physician will either clear an
employee for return to duty, or will do so with some restrictions on ability in place. In the first
instance, the directive has achieved its purpose; the employer may be confident the employee can
return to duty with full ability, and the employee is in no increased danger of discrimination
based on disability. Thus, for employees, particularly those in non-safety-sensitive positions
who are capable of returning to work without restrictions, a single-inquiry directive applies.257
The directive probes no further because no legitimate business reason would justify further
inquiry, and all necessary information has already been relayed to the employer.258
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For employees cleared to come back to work with restrictions, a follow-up inquiry may
kick in as part of the return-to-work policy.259 This secondary inquiry will be particularly
justifiable for employees in safety-sensitive positions.260 In addition to the first inquiry, the
employer may follow up and ask the physician for clarification about the particular restrictions
on the employee’s abilities to perform job-related duties or responsibilities. Note, however, that
asking about the general diagnosis or “nature” of the employee’s illness would be unnecessary,
unjustifiable, and is too risky under the provisions of the ADA. Instead, the employer may
inquire into the specifications regarding the limitations on the employee’s capabilities. The
follow-up questions must be formulated in a way that seeks to uncover facts about the
employee’s ability to complete duties and meet demands at work, not about the employee’s
general health or illness. There is a distinction between revealing how the employee can or
cannot perform the job and the “nature” of his or her sickness. This distinction is to be identified
and heeded by employers seeking to avoid liability with most success in light of dispute between
the Second261 and Sixth262 Circuits. An example of an appropriate follow-up letter follows.
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SAMPLE
[Return-to-Work Directive Follow-Up Request]
Dear Dr. [name]:
[Employee name], a patient of yours, is employed as a [position title] with the
[company name]. I received your initial letter dated [date], wherein you indicated that
[employee name] was able to return to work, but with [insert relevant restrictions as
delineated in first communication from doctor]. In light of [this restriction/these
restrictions/employee’s safety-sensitive position], I find it necessary to request further
clarification of these restrictions upon [his/her] current ability to perform [his/her] duties as a
[position title] at [company name].
[Employee’s name]’s position requires [him/her] to [detailed specifications of
employee’s job possible impacted by health impairments]. In a signed and sealed letter,
please provide any and all relevant insight into how the restrictions you’ve deemed currently
applicable to [employee’s name] will impact [his/her] performance of these duties. I will use
your elaboration in evaluating [his or her] ability to perform these functions at work, and in
deciding whether accommodations in [his or her] work environment or assignments are most
appropriate.
Please mail your elaboration of [Employee’s name] work capability restrictions to the
address below. To preserve confidentiality, please ensure that your response is mailed in a
sealed envelope directly to our Human Resources department, to the attention of [Human
Resources director’s name]. If you have any questions, concerns, or if the information
requested of you is unclear in any way, please contact me at [telephone number] or via email at
[email address] before responding to this request.
Sincerely,

[Authorized Signature]

Thus, carefully-crafted, general return-to-work directives should discard the dual-pronged
inquiry structure exemplified by the City of Columbus’ policy in Lee II.263 Return-to-work
directives applicable to all employees should ask only: Is the employee healthy and ready to
return to the duties of his or her job? Only in special circumstances – either when an employee’s
doctor clears him or her for work with restrictions, or perhaps when the employee fills a safetysensitive position – shall the employer justifiably request further clarification of these
restrictions.264 In nearly all circumstances, an employer should refrain from inquiring into the
“nature” of an employee’s illness, since a legitimate business reason will be lacking to justify
such an action, and it likely violates the ADA and, through incorporation, the Rehabilitation
Act.265
Furthermore, to avoid any form of liability as a result of these policies, employers should
require employees to send doctors’ notes responding to these single-inquiry directives directly to
Human Resources or another higher-level managerial staff member, and not to the employee’s
direct supervisor. In light of Staub, keeping such notes out of the hands of immediate
supervisors is a cautionary, but still highly advisable, step.266 It is cautionary because the
proposed return-to-work directive does not reveal the “nature” of an employee’s illness. While
an unguaranteed inferential step must necessarily occur between a supervisor knowing of one’s
medical absence and then determining an employee’s disability, employers of the belt-andsuspenders school of thought are best advised to keep such information out of the hands of direct
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supervisors to avoid the development of bias.267 Phrased simply, employers seeking to err on the
side of caution in their return-to-work policies are best advised to abide by the theory: “The
fewer people with knowledge of these notes’ content, the better.” Supply immediate supervisors
with only the information necessary to supervise the employee’s job.
ii. Drawbacks of Single-Inquiry Requests are Minor and Fail to Outweigh the Advantages
Some may criticize this proposed directive for not addressing with enough force a
concern of some employers: the cynicism some employers hold for notes from certain
doctors.268 A legitimate concern exists that employees can game the system by having a
physician pen a note clearing the employee to return to work and he or she has not truly been
ill.269 This criticism does not, however, debunk the validity of the proposed directive or make it
any less advisable.
To begin, no directive should be developed with this cynical concern chiefly in mind.
Just as the practice of clients placing their trust in counsel is inherent to the legal system’s
functioning, an employer having a reasonable level of belief in the medical profession is inherent
and essential to any successful return-to-work policy. Furthermore, while the proposed directive
may not tackle this cynical concern head-on, it does not completely ignore this possibility either.
The directive allows for employers to follow-up on the specific limitations on employee ability
in light of any restrictions or when an employer is particularly concerned because the employee
fills a safety-sensitive position. Follow-up inquiry is allowable in these instances because there
is a legitimate business reason that justifies further probing and because even the follow-up
questions need not and should not dive into the “nature” of a general diagnosis. An employer
could argue with equal success that successive notes from the same doctor raise red flags in the
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company’s Human Resources department and that it was therefore justified in following up in
same manner specified above. Thus, when confronted with cynicism, employers may follow the
secondary series of inquiries, so long as the questions do not violate the formula above.
Another criticism of the proposed directive logically follows this response to the first
criticism: A single-prong directive with an optional follow-up provision will consume more time
and resources than a dual-pronged return-to-work policy. Concededly, whichever department in
charge of following up with appropriate directive responses will have to contact the employee’s
doctor once more. This contact, however, is likely as simple as sending another letter through
the mail. Presumably the price of postage pales in comparison to the costs of litigation.
Furthermore, any extra work imposed by the proposed policy truly falls onto the medical
professionals involved, not the company – and they seem willing to shoulder the burden.270 As
noted above, medical professionals are uncomfortable with broad-reaching directives asking
questions that may reveal a patient’s sickness.271 It seems likely medical professionals will
happily provide follow-up answers regarding a patient’s ability to perform his or her duties at
work as a means of complying with their own oaths and ethics.272
In addition, serious calculations of risk and costs would have to be shouldered by a
company insisting on a dual-pronged directive in the wake of Conroy and Lee II. While a dualpronged policy may be cheaper up front, this Comment reveals why such a policy will likely
expose an employer to liability under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Thus, a wise employer
must calculate the possible costs of litigation incurred through a dual-prong policy, and weigh
those against the minimally increased costs of a single-inquiry directive with follow-up option.
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One struggles to fathom a situation where the former is not significantly more expensive than the
latter.
Finally, one cannot ignore the ethical dilemma present behind a policy that a company
knows will likely violate the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. If and when such a violation comes
before a court, the bench is far less likely to show an employer any compassion when an easilyimplemented, equally effective policy was available to it. Also, not only would courts view
ethically questionable choice harshly, but employees may take notice, and ultimately the
company could struggle to retain its talent. With a simple, effective and ethically superior option
available, employers are best advised against dual-pronged return-to-work policies in favor of
single-inquiry directives with an option of follow-up.
V. Conclusion
Whenever the federal circuits are split on a given issue pertaining to employment,
employers’ concern about incurring liability is heightened by the unequal footing the competing
decisions yield. For this reason, employer blogs were abuzz with news following the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Lee II.273 Some saw it as employer-friendly, while others were more
reserved in their judgment of how the decision would define treatment of employers’ return-towork directives over time.
An analysis of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning reveals the Lee II holding is too perforated
with unsound support for employers to find any valid comfort in the decision.274 The Sixth
Circuit relies on two faulty distinctions.275 The first, an attempted distinction between the
meaning of “nature” of an illness and of “general diagnosis,” is literally unfounded.276 The court
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never establishes why or how the difference between these two terms exists.277 Instead, it
assumes a distinction that is either nonexistent, or that is so transparent employers are ill-advised
to rely upon it.278 Secondly, the Sixth Circuit attempts to define a higher standard for plaintiffs
to meet under the Rehabilitation Act with little success.279 The similarities between the
definitions of “necessitate” and “intend” on one side of the standard, and “tend to” on the other
are too numerous to ignore, and too revealing not to be categorized as persuasive.280
More importantly, consideration of the Sixth Circuit’s holding in real-world application
reveals the major failings of its ruling.281 Even if the validity of these faulty distinctions drawn
with legal terms of art could be argued in theory, they fail in practice.282 When applied,
directives like that in Conroy,283 deemed a violation of the law, will likely produce the same
doctors’ notes as directives like the one considered in Lee II,284 inappropriately deemed
acceptable under the Rehabilitation Act.285 Finally, this conversation is all the more complicated
by the Supreme Court’s recent Staub decision,286 which leaves one to wonder if the Sixth Circuit
would have decided differently regarding the issue of handing doctor’s notes to immediate
supervisors had the Staub holding come down earlier.287 In light of Staub, the Lee II court’s
approval of submitting doctor’s notes to immediate supervisors is cast into detrimental doubt.288
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Employers are encouraged to do away with generalized, dual-pronged return-to-work
directives applicable to all employees.289 Instead, employers are best advised to adopt a singleinquiry directive for all employees, with an option to follow-up for cases involving safetysensitive position-holding employees or employees returning to duty with restrictions.290 This
follow-up option pacifies employers’ cynicism regarding the validity of doctors’ notes.291
Finally, a comparison of the costs of a single-inquiry directive to the costs of disability
discrimination-based litigation debunks the argument that the proposed directives will cost more
than a dual-pronged policy.292
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